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LABOR LAW

- SECONDARY PICKETING "Buy LOCAL" CAMPAIGN AT
A NEUTRAL BUSINESS VIOLATES SECTION 8(b)(4) OF THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

ACr.

Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812 v. NLRB (D.C. Cir. 1980)
In response to a continuing loss of jobs in the New York area
soft drink bottling industry,1 Soft Drink Workers Union Local 8122
decided in early 1978 to institute a "buy local" campaign to encourage the public to purchase locally bottled products.3 As part of that
campaign, Local 812 began picketing 4 and handbilling 5 in front of
*Editor's Note: As this Note went to print, the principal opinion had not
yet been published in the Federal Reporter. For the convenience of our
readers, the case is cited throughout to the Labor Relations Reference Manual
(L.R.R.M.) service. For the record, the official citation is: Soft Drink Workers
Union Local 812 v. NLRB, No. 79-1888 (D.C. Cir., October 3, 1980).
1. Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812 v. NLRB, 105 L.R.R.M. 2658,
2660 (D.C. Cir. 1980). From 1976 to 1978, the area's bottlers suffered a "serious
loss" of business which resulted in the elimination of an estimated 1,000 jobs
in 1977, 600 of which had been held by members of Local 812. Id. at 2660
& n.3.
2. Id. at 2659. Local 812 represents employees of several soda bottlers in
and around New York City. Id.
3. Id. at 2660.
4. Id. The picketing was carried on seven days a week, and was found
to be peaceful by the National Labor Relations Board. Id. See 243 N.L.R.B.
No. 126 (1979). The pickets, ranging in number from six to sixteen, carried
signs which read:

To the Consumer,
Please Buy Soft Drinks Made Locally.

Stop Unemployment Here.
Local 812,

Soft Drink Workers Union,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters.

105 L.R.R.M. at 2658, 2660. The pickets also chanted slogans such as: "Be a
smart consumer. Keep the tax dollars in New York;" and "Read the label
before you put it on the table." Id. at 2660.
5. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2660. The handbilling, i.e., the distribution of informational materials, was carried on concurrent to the picketing. Id. The
handbills distributed read:

BUY LOCAL
THANK YOU
For purchasing a local product.

In the past year - in the New York Metropolitan Region
alone - there was a loss of 125,000 jobs - and more going.
We urge you to save our jobs - your neighbors [sic] - by
buying soft drinks manufactured and distributed locally.

SOFT DRINK WORKERS UNION,
LOCAL 812, I.B.T.
Id.
(1101)
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Monarch Long Beach Corporation's (Monarch's) 6 retail beverage store
in March, 1978.7
Monarch filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National
Labor Relations Board (Board), alleging that the conduct amounted
to a secondary boycott s in violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the
National Labor Relations Act (Act)9 A complaint was issued, and the
General Counsel of the Board sought to enjoin the picketing under
section 10(l) of the Act, but was denied relief by the district court.'*
The Board itself later affirmed an Administrative Law Judge's finding
of a secondary boycott unfair labor practice, and issued a cease and desist order against the picketing."
On the union's petition for review, a panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, and
6. Id. Monarch, although primarily a wholesaler of beer and soda, also
operates the single retail beverage store at which Local 812 began its
activities. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 2659-60. A secondary boycott is one in which the union directs
its activities toward people dealing with the primary employer, such as customers, to bring further economic pressure upon the main disputant. SeeLoewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), afJ'd on rehearing, 235 U.S. 522 (1911).

9. 243 N.L.R.B. No. 126 (1979). Although § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) does not explicitly condemn the secondary boycott, the statute's focus has been conceded to
be that type of union conduct. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 241
(1976); Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
(pts. 1-2), 73 HARV. L. REV. 850, 1086, 1112-13 (1960); Cox, The LandrumGriffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. RLv.

257, 270-71 (1959).
Section 8(b)(4) provides in relevant part:

(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents 4(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce
or in industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object
thereof is (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any
other person....
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976).
10. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2660.
11. Id. See 243 N.L.R.B. No. 126 (1979).
The Board rejected the
union's contention that the lack of a traditional labor dispute over wages or

benefits was a bar to the Board's action. Id. Reasoning that the appeal was,
to discourage sales of nonlocally bottled soda, the Board found that a secondary boycott existed as to Monarch. Id. The Board concluded that the
union had failed to keep the appeal "closely confined to the primary dispute."
Id., quoting NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377
U.S. 58, 72 (1964). For a discussion of Tree Fruits, see notes 27-39 and
accompanying text infra. Local 812's placards were held to be vague since
they failed to identify either the struck product or the primary employer.
243 N.L.R.B. No. 126. The Board maintained that further confusion was
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granted the Board's cross-application for enforcement, 12 holding that
a "buy local" campaign can violate section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, and can be proscribed consistent with first
amendment rights. Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812 v. NLRB, 105
L.R.R.M. 2658 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Picketing has been recognized as a constitutionally protected form
of speech since Thornhill v. Alabama."3 Although the Thornhill Court
stated that this right is subject to limitation, 14 it held that the mere
threat of an injury to a business is not a sufficient basis to justify a
general infringement of first amendment rights. 15

Only a "clear danger

of substantive evils," the Court stated, could override picketers' first
amendment rights.' 6 The Supreme Court has since stated that the
"compulsive features" of picketing are afforded less protection than
17
other purer forms of communication.
generated in the consumer's mind when, in many instances, the place of
bottling could not be determined by examining the containers. Id.
Picketing continued until a New York state court issued a preliminary
injunction barring further picketing pending resolution of this appeal. 105
L.R.R.M. at 2660.
12. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2559.
13. 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1939). The Court in Thornhill struck down an
Alabama statute that forbade all picketing or loitering about a place of
business for the purpose of affecting the trade of that business. Id. at 91-92.
An important factor in the Court's decision was the overbroad nature of the
statute, construed to leave no room for "exceptions based upon either the
number of the persons engaged in the proscribed activity, the peaceful char-

acter of their demeanor, the nature of their dispute with an employer, or the
restrained character and the accuracy of the terminology used in notifying the
public of the facts of the dispute." Id. at 99.
14. Id. at 103-04. The Court stated:
It is true that the rights of employers and employees to conduct
their economic affairs and to compete with others for a share in the
products of industry are subject to modification or qualification in the
interests of the society in which they exist. This is but an instance
of the power of the State to set the limits of permissible contest open
to industrial combatants. . . It does not follow that the State in
dealing with the evils arising from industrial disputes may impair the
effective exercise of the right to discuss freely industrial relations
which are matters of public concern. A contrary conclusion could be
used to support abridgement of freedom of speech and the press
concerning almost every matter of importance to society.
Id. (citations omitted).
15. Id. at 105.

16. Id. at 104-05.

For examples of properly prohibited picketing, see

Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (picketing to force
employer to violate antitrust law held properly enjoined); Cafeteria Employees
Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943) (picketing accompanied by threats and
intimidation held constitutionally restrained); Hotel & Restaurant Employees'
Int'l Alliance v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 437 (1941)
(violent picketing held properly enjoined).
17. Hughes v. Superior Ct., 339 U.S. 460, 465-68 (1950). See also Cox,
Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REV. 574, 592-97 (1951).
Professor Cox states that the invocation of sanctions by the union marks the
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The secondary boycott traditionally has not been accorded the
favored status of other union activities, and has a long history of con'demnation by the courts.1 8 It was not until the Taft-Hartley Act of
1947, however, that Congress first attempted to legislate against the
secondary boycott,1 9 but section 8(b)(4) of Taft-Hartley failed to fulfill
ithe drafters' objective of totally banning this union weapon. 20 Primarily due to the vague, indirect language selected, 21 the courts read
!section 8(b)(4) to permit picketing directed at consumers of a secondary
22
employer.
In an attempt to remedy the "problems" 28 with the initial Act,
section 8(b)(4) was amended in 1959 by the Landrum-Griffin Act.2 4
line at which restrictions are proper, because the speech elements become
:secondary at that point. Id. at 593-94.
18. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921)

(secondary boycott not excepted from Sherman Antitrust Act by Clayton Act);
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), afl'd on rehearing, 235 U.S. 522 (1911)
(secondary boycott found to violate Sherman Antitrust Act); Bricklayers' Union
v. Seymour Ruff & Sons, 160 Md. 483, 154 A. 52 (1931) (secondary boycott
illegal under common law).
19. See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, amending
National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
:§§ 151-169 (1976)).
20. Aaron, supra note 9, at 1113. Professor Aaron states that the clear
-objective of Congress was "to prevent a union engaged in a primary strike
against employer A from putting pressure on him by inducing the employees

-of employer B to stop work with the object of compelling B to cease doing
business with A."

Id.

21. Id. The term "secondary boycott" was frequently discussed in the
hearings and debates in Congress prior to passing this Act. See, e.g., S. REP. No.

105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1947), reprinted in STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON
LABOR OF THE U.S. SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 93D CONG.,

-2D SEss., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACr 428
(Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as COMM. PRINT]; S. MIN. REP. No. 105,

80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1947), reprinted in COMM. PRINT, supra, at 481; 93
CONG. REC. A1296 (1947) (extension of remarks of Rep. Landis), reprinted in
'COMM. PRINT, supra, at 583; 93 CONG. REc. 3950 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft),
reprinted in COMM. PRINT, supra, at 1006; 93 CONG. REC. 4155 (1947) (remarks
,of Sen. Murray), reprinted in COMM. PRINT, supra, at 1047; 93 CONG. REc.
4897-98 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Thomas), reprinted in COMM. PRINT, supra, at
1341. However, the term was neither defined nor explicitly mentioned in
-§8(b)(4). See Aaron, supra note 9, at 1112-13.
22. See, e.g., United Wholesale &cWarehouse Employees, Local 261 v.
NLRB, 282 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1960); NLRB v. Brewery Workers Local No.
366, 272 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1959); NLRB v. Service, Trade, Chauffeurs, Salesmen, &cHelpers, Local 145, 191 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1951).
23. It should be noted that it was management which supported the
position that amendments were needed to strengthen § 8(b)(4). See Aaron,
supra note 9, at 852. For a discussion of several of the "loopholes" in the
'Taft-Hartley Act, see R. GoRMAN, supra note 9, at 244-47, 251-54; Aaron, supra,
at 1110-15. Labor's view of the Taft-Hartley Act, however, was one of
adamant opposition. See Comment, Consumer Picketing: Reassessing the
'Concept of Employer Neutrality, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 172, 176 n.19 (1977).
24. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 541,
.§704, amending National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976)).
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Most commentators assumed that the amendments, backed by a seemingly clear legislative history,25 created a per se ban on picketing at a
secondary employer's business. 28 The Supreme Court defeated these
expectations, however, in NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers, Local
760 (Tree Fruits),27 holding that section 8(b)(4) did allow some forms.

28
of secondary activities by unions.
In Tree Fruits, the union called a strike against fruit packers and
warehousemen.2 9 The union picketed 46 Safeway stores, appealing to.
the stores' customers not to buy apples which Safeway had purchased

from the struck firms.8o

The Tree Fruits Court began its analysis by expressing concern
that an overbroad ban on secondary picketing might collide with the
first amendment31 Echoing the language used in ThornhiU.2 theCourt in Tree Fruits set forth its mode of statutory interpretation,
stating: "In the sensitive area of peaceful picketing Congress has dealt
explicitly with isolated evils which experience has established flow from
such picketing." aa Further, the Court stated that in order for it to
recognize a legislative intent to ban peaceful picketing, it must have
the "clearest indication" of that intent from Congress.8 4
Using this standard of interpretation, the Tree Fruits Court held
that the "requisite clarity" to support a broad ban on all consumer
picketing at secondary businesses was missing from the legislative history
of section 8(b)(4).85 Therefore, the Court reasoned, such picketing
25. See Comment, supra note 23, at 178 n.35; Note, Peaceful Consumer
Picketing at Secondary Site Not Prohibited by Section 8(b)(4) of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 33 FoRDHAM L. REv. 112, 114-15 (1965).
26. See Aaron, supra note 9, at 1114; Cox, supra note 9, at 274.

27. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
28. Id. at 71.

29. Id. at 59.
30. Id. at 59-60. The union's appeal was limited strictly to that purposeby: 1)union instructions directing the pickets not to interfere with deliveries,.
employees, or consumers; 2) placards that mentioned only the struck product;

and 3) handbills that expressly noted that the Safeway stores were not being:
struck. Id. at 59-61, 60 n.3.
31. Id. at 63, 70-71. This concern then dictated a narrow interpretation

of the statute. See notes 32-34 and accompanying text infra. Both Justice
Black's concurring and Justice Harlan's dissenting opinions thought that the
case turned on the first amendment issue. See 377 U.S.
(Black,ofJ.,thesecon-discussion
For ata 76-80
curring); id. at 80-94 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
opinions, see note 39 infra.

32. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
33. 377 U.S. at 62-63, quoting NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Locar

Union No. 639, 362 U.S. 274, 284 (1959).
34. 377 U.S. at 63.
35. Id. The Court observed:
All that the legislative history shows in the way of an 'isolated evil'
believed to require proscriptions of peaceful consumer picketing at
secondary sites, was its use to persuade the customers of the secondary
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does not per se "threaten, coerce, or restrain" a secondary employer
under that section.30 If the union's actions appeal to the consumers
to boycott only the "struck product" rather than all the services of the
secondary employer, no unfair labor practice is established under section 8(b)(4).37 Rejecting the court of appeals test based on a loss or
threat of loss to the secondary employer, 3s the Tree Fruits Court concluded that the union had not violated section 8(b)(4) because its appeal
was "closely confined" to the struck product and did not urge a general
boycott of the Safeway stores.3 9
employer to cease trading with him in order to force him to cease
dealing with, or to put pressure upon, the primary employer.
Id.

In discussing the legislative history, the Tree Fruits Court found it significant that in the Senate, neither of the bill's chief proponents pointed to
consumer picketing as the compelling reason for the amendments. Id. at 65-67.
Similarly, the Court pointed to the language of Congressman Griffin who had
stated: "[O]f course this bill and any other bill is limited by the constitutional
right of free speech. If the purpose of the picketing is to coerce the retailer
not to do business with the manufacturer .

.

. ,

the amendments will reach

that conduct." Id. at 68, citing 105 CONG. REC. 15673 (1959) (emphasis supplied
by the Court). The Supreme Court also found it to be significant that one
of the bill's authors thought its reach over secondary picketing was constrained
to the limited type of coercion italicized. 377 U.S. at 68.
The Tree Fruits Court noted the language of the Conference Committee
Chairman, Senator Kennedy, who had stated:
The prohibition [of the House bill] reaches not only picketing but
leaflets, radio, broadcasts and newspaper advertisements, thereby interfering with freedom of speech ...

[O]ne of the apparent purposes of the amendment is to prevent
unions from appealing to the general public as consumers for assistance in a labor dispute. This is a basic infringement on freedom
of expression.
577 U.S. at 69, citing 105 CONG. REc. 16591 (1959). Although this seems to
indicate that Senator Kennedy viewed the amendments as supporting a broad
ban on picketing, the Court disagreed, noting that he was speaking at the time
in support of a publicity proviso to the amendment. 377 U.S. at 70. However,
the Court did find the remarks supportive of a congressional concern for the
potential conflict with the first amendment. Id.

36. 377 U.S. at 71.

The Court, rejecting the contention that the public

would react automatically to the picketing and fail to notice the limited
thrust of the union's appeal, noted that, irrespective of the actual results of the
picketing, the legislative history did not express disapproval of all consumer
picketing with the requisite "clearest indication." Id.
37. Id. at 72-73.
38. Id. This standard was later approved, however, for severe economic
injury in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Title),
447 U.S. 607 (1980). For a discussion of Safeco Title, see notes 48-54 and
accompanying text infra.
39. 377 U.S. at 71-72. Unlike the majority, both the concurring opinion
of Justice Black, and the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan, concluded that
the legislative history supported a finding that the secondary boycott provision
reached the union's conduct in the instant case. Id. at 76 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 80-92 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The two opinions reached different
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. The Board and the courts of appeals have extended the Tree Fruits
requirement that the union's appeal be "closely confined to the primary dispute" 40 to also require that the pickets' signs clearly identify
and limit the appeal to the primary employer's products. 41 Moreover,
an early interpretation of section 8(b)(4) concluded that the union's
ultimate objective is irrelevant if an illegal purpose can be shown, or
42
is inferrable from, the conduct of the picketing.
Since Tree Fruits, two major lines of analysis have developed to
test for the "isolated evil" 43 in secondary picketing aimed at consumers. 44 The "merged product" 45 cases have held that picketing at
a secondary site is impermissible when the struck product is inseparable
from the overall business of the secondary employer, thereby, in effect,
urging a general boycott of the neutral's business. 46 The second test
conclusions on whether the prohibition was permissible under the first amendment.
Justice Black, while recognizing the dual nature of picketing as both
speech and conduct, stated that regulation of the conduct aspect must be
scrutinized to ensure that the speech rights are not unduly infringed. Id. at
77-78 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black concluded that the conduct banned
by the statute was only the dissemination of information, which was not a
justifiable state interest to regulate the union's conduct. Id. at 78-79 (Black, J.,
concurring). Only a traditionally recognized basis, such as maintaining public

order, could justify such a regulation. Id. at 79 (Black, J., concurring).
Therefore, Justice Black concurred as he found § 8(b)(4) constitutionally infirm
in basing its proscription on the expression of certain views. Id.
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, concluded that the statute was
constitutional because other methods of communication were available to the
union. Id. at 93 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan reasoned that Congress' weighing of first amendment rights against the problems attendant with
secondary picketing was entitled to "great deference." Id.
40. 377 U.S. at 72.
41. See Bedding, Curtain & Drapery Workers Union, Local 140 v. NLRB,
390 F.2d 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968); NLRB v. Upholsterers,
Frame Se Bedding Workers Twin City Local No. 62, 331 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.
1964); Local 248, Meat & Allied Food Workers, 230 N.L.R.B. 189 (1977).
42. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. 8 Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 685-88
(1951).
43 See notes 32-33 and accompanying text supra.

44. See notes 45-54 and accompanying text infra. See generally Comment,
Consumer Picketing and the Single-Product Secondary Employer, 47 U. CHI.
L. Rav. 112 (1979).
45. See R. GORMAN, supra note 9, at 259-61.
46. See, e.g., Cement Masons Local 337 v. NLRB, 468 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1972) (struck product was homes; secondary employer was real estate developer); American Bread Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147
(6th Cir. 1969) (struck product was bread; secondary employer was restaurant
owner); Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 952 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (struck product was advertising services; secondary employers were
local merchants); NLRB v. Local 254, Bldg. Serv. Employees, 359 F.2d 289 (1st
Cir. 1966) (struck product was janitorial services; secondary employer was
business contracting for the services). Contra, United Paperworkers Local 832,
236 N.L.R.B. 1525 (1978) (struck product was paper bags; secondary employer
was grocery store). See also Comment, supra note 23, at 132-34.
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was recently announced by the Supreme Court when it held that secondary boycotts having a severe economic impact upon the neutral em7
ployer were banned under section 8(b)(4).4
In NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco
Title) 48 the union struck Safeco Title Insurance Company, and picketed
five firms which sold that company's policies. 49 The union urged the
secondary employers' customers to cancel their Safeco Title policies. 50
Over ninety percent of the five neutral businesses' income was derived
from sales of Safeco Title policies. 1 Although the Safeco Title Court
reaffirmed the Tree Fruits requirement of clear congressional intent to
proscribe an "isolated evil," 52 it rejected the Tree Fruits language stating that economic loss by the secondary employer is irrelevant.58 The
47. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Title),
447 U.S. 607 (1980). For prior discussions of the economic impact test, see

Comment, supra note 23, at 189-201; Note, Secondary Consumer-ProductPicketing Resulting in Substantial Economic Harm to the Business of the Secondary
is Not Illegal, 10 GA. L. REv. 871 (1976).

48. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
49. Id. at 609.
50. Id. at 610.
51. Id. at 609.
52. Id. at 612. See notes 32-33 and accompanying text supra. Justice
Powell's first amendment analysis gained the support of only a plurality of
the Court. See 447 U.S. at 608. justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist in this portion of his opinion. Id.
Justice Blackmun, joining all parts of Justice Powell's opinion with the
exception of the first amendment analysis, expressed difficulty in reconciling
the Supreme Court's past rejections of content-based laws with § 8(b)(4)'s
apparent content selectivity. Id. at 616-17 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 445 (1980) (statute banning all rtonlaborpicketing
at residences constitutes impermissible content selectivity); Police Dept. v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (statute banning all nonlabor picketing near schools
constitutes impermissible content selectivity). Justice Blackmun read Mosley
as rejecting any content selectivity in statutes affecting picketing. 447 U.S. at
617 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part). See also note 39 supra. Nevertheless,
Justice Blackmun concurred in the result because he was "reluctant to hold
unconstitutional Congress' striking of the delicate balance between union
freedom of expression and the ability of neutral[s] . . . to remain free from

coerced participation in industrial strife." 447 U.S. at 617-18 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part).
Justice Stevens found &8(b)(4) constitutional as regulating the conduct,
not speech, aspect of picketing, therefore avoiding content-selective regulation
of speech. Id. at 618-19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). The plurality did
not deal with question of content selectivity, finding justification for the
regulation in the congressional objective of protecting neutral employers. 447
U.S. at 616.
53. 447 U.S. at 612. See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760
(Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. at 72-73. The Safeco Title Court distinguished Tree
Fruits, stating:

The product picketed in Tree Fruits was but one item among the many
that made up the retailer's trade ....

The neutral therefore has little

reason to become involved in the labor dispute. In this case, on the
other hand, the title companies sell only the primary employer's
product ....

Secondary picketing against consumption of the primary
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Safeco Title Court announced that the test under section 8(b)(4) is
whether "the secondary appeal is reasonably likely to threaten the neutral party with ruin or substantial loss."54

Although in most instances the existence of a "labor dispute""5
is readily apparent, the jurisdiction of the Board over secondary boycott charges has been held to be constrained by the necessity of a preliminary finding of such a dispute.56 The Fourth Circuit, in NLRB v.
InternationalLongshoremen's Association,57 held that the Board lacked
the "indispensible prerequisite" of a labor dispute6 8 defined as a controversy over "terms and conditions of employment." 59 The Fourth
Circuit's view, however, has been rejected by courts and commentators
alike. 60 The accepted consensus is that the absence of a labor dispute,
product leaves responsive consumers no realistic option other than to
boycott the title companies altogether.
447 U.S. at 613 (citation omitted).
54. 447 U.S. at 615-16 n.11.
55. Section 2(9) of the Act defines a "labor dispute" as "any controversy
concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless
of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee." 29 US.C. § 152(9) (1976). The phrase "labor dispute" is not used
in defining any of the unfair labor practices enumerated in the Act. See id.
§ 158(a)-(g). The Board's jurisdiction is defined as the power to prevent any
unfair labor practices. Id. § 160(a).
56. NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir.
1964).
57. Id. The union (ILA) had refused to supply workers to a ship fitting
company that had contracted to overhaul a vessel owned by Ocean Shipping
Ltd. (Ocean). Id. at 993-94. The ship was on the ILA's "blacklist" of ships
engaged in trade with Cuba. Id. at 993. Ocean filed a secondary boycott unfair labor practice charge against the ILA, alleging coercion of the ship fitting
company to cease dealing with Ocean. Id. at 994.
58. Id. at 995-96. The court stated that the key factor in its decision was
not the lack of a primary disputant, but rather, the absence of any labor
dispute within the statutory definition. Id. The court cited as supporting
this proposition Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama Steamship Co., 362 U.S.
365 (1960). See 332 F.2d 995. The Marine Cooks Court stated in dictum that
the purpose of the Taft-Hartley Act was "to regulate the conduct of people
engaged in labor disputes," but did not speak in terms of the Board's juris
diction. See 362 U.S. at 372.
59. 332 F.2d at 995-96, quoting 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1958). For the complete text of the present § 152(9), see note 55 supra. The Court held that the
ILA's activities were purely political in nature, being motivated by the Cuban
missile crisis. 332 F.2d at 993, 995-96.
60. See, e.g., National Maritime Union v. NLRB (Delta Steamship Lines),
346 F.2d 411, 414-20 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965) (rejecting the
Fourth Circuit's analysis); National Maritime Union v. NLRB (Weyerhauser),
342 F.2d 538, 540-45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 835 (1965) (Fourth Circuit
holding limited to political controversies); Mountain Navigation Co. v. Seafarer's Int'l Ass'n, 348 F. Supp. 1298, 1302-03 (W.D. Wisc. 1971) (Fourth Circuit
holding limited to political controversies).
One commentator has argued that such an interpretation of the Act, when
considering a § 8(b)(4) charge, would "frustrate" the goal of preventing coercion
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and hence, of a primary employer, does not prevent a finding that section 8(b)(4) has been violated. 61
It was against this background that the Soft Drink Workers court
considered the union's appeal from the Board's finding of a section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) unfair labor practice. 62 The court began its analysis by
rejecting the union's claim that the absence of a "conventional labor
dispute" 68 required reversal for lack of both jurisdiction
and a secondary boycott unfair labor practice. 65
The jurisdiction of the Board, the court held, was clearly not constrained by the Act to traditional labor disputes. 66 Turning to the
union's assertion that a traditional labor dispute is a prerequisite to
the Board finding a section 8(b)(4) violation, the court stated that the
main objective of the secondary boycott provision is to protect neutral
of a secondary employer regardless of the nature of the dispute. 78 HARv. L.
REV. 463, 464 (1964). Another commentator, after examining the language of
the Act, could find no support for the Fourth Circuit's view. See Note, Jurisdiction of National Labor Relations Board-Necessity of Labor Dispute, 50
IA. L. REV. 946, 950-52 (1965). See also Note, Refusal To Refer Employees for
Work Upon a Single Ship Found Not To Be a Secondary Boycott, 113 U. PA.
L. REV. 1317, 1318-21 (1965) (jurisdictional limitation in Fourth Circuit's holding "hinders protection of secondary employer who," although uninvolved, is
always affected whatever the cause of the dispute); Note, NLRB Lacks Jurisdiction Over Union's Refusal To Supply Labor to Secondary Employer For
Work on Primary Employer's Ship Where Union's Action Is Based on Political
Controversy Unrelated to Labor Dispute With Primary Employer, 51 VA. L.
REV. 157, 161 (1965) ("[Ejmphasis upon cause rather than effect [in a § 8(b)(4)]

charge seems unsound").

61. See National Maritime Union v. NLRB (Delta Steamship Lines), 346
F.2d 411, 414-20 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965); National Maritime Union v. NLRB (Weyerhauser), 342 F.2d 538, 540-45 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 835 (1965); NLRB v. Washington-Oregon Shingle Weavers'
District Council, 211 F.2d 149, 151-53 (9th Cir. 1954).
62. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2658. The appeal was before a panel of the District
of Columbia Circuit consisting of Chief judge Wright and Judges Mikva and
Wald. Id. at 2659. Chief Judge Wright wrote the majority opinion, with
Judge Wald submitting a dissent. Id.
63. Id. at 2662-64. The court conceded that the factual record failed to
establish a "conventional labor dispute" in that the union was not seeking to
organize the employees of either Monarch or the nonlocal bottlers. Id. at 2662.
For the Act's definition of labor dispute, see note 55 supra.
64. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2662. The union maintained that the Board's jurisdiction was limited to situations where a union was seeking to improve its
position vis-t-vis the employer of the union members. Id.
65. Id. at 2662-64. Without a conventional labor dispute, the union maintained, there could be no primary employer, and therefore, no secondary
employer or boycott. Id. at 2662. For a discussion of the need for a traditional
labor dispute, see notes 55-61 and accompanying text supra.
66. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2662. In rejecting the union's position, the court
relied on precedent within the circuit. Id., citing National Maritime Union
v. NLRB (Delta Steamship Lines), 346 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 840 (1965). The Soft Drink Workers court noted with approval that Delta
Steamship Lines had rejected the only decision cited by the union in support
of its argument, NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 332 F.2d 992.
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employers from becoming embroiled in the labor conflicts of others. 67
Thus, the court reasoned, the only preliminary finding required to
activate section 8(b)(4) and its sanctions, is that the union's picketing
must be "tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere." 68
The court found that the union was trying, through its picketing, to
"enhanc[e] job opportunities of union members at local manufacturing
plants." 69 Because this objective was unrelated to Monarch's operations, the court concluded that Monarch was a neutral employer de10
serving protection under the Act.
The Soft Drink Workers court therefore proceeded to analyze the
union's conduct in light of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).71 Applying the Tree
Fruits construction of the secondary boycott provision,72 the court of
appeals found two components to such an unfair labor charge: 1) a
union objective of forcing the secondary employer to cease trading
with another employer; and 2) the use of coercive means by the union. 8
In finding that the union exhibited a proscribed objective, 4 the
court rejected the claim that Local 812 had appealed to consumers to
(4th Cir. 1964). 105 L.R.R.M. at 2662 n.10. For a discussion of the Fourth
Circuit case, see notes 56-61 and accompanying text supra.
In the alternative, the Soft Drink Workers court stated that if proof of a
"labor dispute" was a threshold requisite, the scope of that term "might be
broad enough to encompass the controversy in this case." 105 L.R.R.M. at
2662 n.11. The court believed the Fourth Circuit's decision was distinguishable
under a broad definition of labor dispute because the union in that case was
politically, rather than economically motivated. Id. at 2662 n.11. See NLRB
v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1964).
67. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2663. The court found support for this proposition
in the legislative history of the Act and in precedent from both within and
outside the District of Columbia Circuit. Id. at 2663-64. See National Maritime Union v. NLRB (Delta Steamship Lines), 346 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965); National Maritime Union v. NLRB (Weyerhauser),
342 F.2d 538 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 835 (1965); NLRB v. WashingtonOregon Shingle Weavers' District Council, 211 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1954).
68. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2663-64 (citation omitted). The court noted that
§ 8(b)(4) does not specifically outlaw secondary boycotts. Id. at 2663. The
proper analysis, the court observed, requires a comparison of the union's
conduct to that proscribed in the statute. Id.
69. Id. at 2664.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 2664-70. For the text of this provision, see note 9 supra.
72. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2664-70. The court noted that the Board in its consideration of this controversy, incorrectly found that Tree Fruits announced an
exception to § 8(b)(4). rd. at 2664 n.16. The court concluded, therefore, that
the Board's analysis should not have been limited to determining whether
Local 812's actions were identical to those taken by the union in Tree Fruits.
Id. For a discussion of Tree Fruits, see notes 27-39 and accompanying text
supra.
73. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2664.
74. Id. The court stated that the Supreme Court had held that only a
union objective need be proscribed, not necessarily the ultimate union goal.
Id., citing NLRB v. Denver Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675,
688-89 (1951).
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buy locally bottled soda. Rather, the court found that the union had
urged consumers to cease buying nonlocal bottlers' products. 8 Noting that Local 812's objective may have been the same as the union's
objective in Tree Fruits, the Soft Drink Workers court held nonetheless that this similarity was of no avail to Local 812 since the Tree
Fruits Court had based its holding on the lack of coercion.70
Turning to the second component of a section 8(b)(4) violation,
whether the means used "threaten, coerce, or restrain" Monarch,7 7 the
Soft Drink Workers court recognized that "buy local" campaigns closely
paralleled the union conduct in Tree Fruits.78

Drawing on the Tree

Fruits language indicating that coercion could be found if the appeal
was not "closely confined to the primary dispute," T the court concluded
that the similarity did not automatically legitimate this picketing for
it still must be shown that the union adequately identified the struck
product.8 0 The court held that Local 812 had made an overbroad
appeal in that their signs: 1) failed to define the term "local"; 81 2)
failed to adequately identify the soda products which the consumer
should buy; 82 and 3) gave an indication that a complete boycott was
75. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2665. The court stated that the slogan chanted by
the picketers, "[r]ead the label before you put it on the table," evidenced this
objective. Id. at 2665 n.18.
76. Id. at 2665-66. For a discussion of Tree Fruits, see notes 27-39 and
accompanying text supra. The court dismissed the union's contention that its
conduct was legal because it was not aimed at inducing a general boycott,
reasoning that the forbidden objective need only be to force a cessation of
business between the primary and secondary employers - an objective which
can result from less than a total boycott. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2665 n.19.
77. For the relevant text of § 8(b)(4), see note 9 supra.
78. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2666.
79. Id. at 2666, quoting NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760
(Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. at 72.
80. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2666-67.

Citing Tree Fruits, the Soft Drink Workers

court stated that the failure to isolate the primary dispute created a new
conflict with the secondary employer. Id. at 2667, citing NLRB v. Fruit &
Vegetable Packers, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. at 72. This separate
dispute coerces the neutral since the harm to him is potentially greater than
if the union successfully, through a primary strike, stopped only the primary
employer's production. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2667. The fact that here, unlike in a
conventional labor dispute, the union could not continue primary activities if
its "buy local" campaign was stopped, was held to be irrelevant on the ground
that the statute is simply concerned with the secondary effects on the neutral.
Id. The court further noted that the Board did not have to hold that the
nonlocal bottlers were the primary disputants in light of this statutory construction. Id. at 2668.
The court cited as further support for its conclusion that the primary
dispute must be isolated the so-called "merged product" cases. Id. at 2666
n.20. For a discussion of the "merged product" cases, see notes 45-46 and
accompanying text supra.
81. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2669-70. For the message on the placards and handbills, see notes 4 & 5 supra.
82. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2669-70. The court noted that it was difficult to
identify the favored products because the place of bottling was often not
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intended when considered together with the pickets' vocal exhortations.8 3
The court then considered the union's contention that, even if Local 812's appeal was overbroad, its conduct was illegal only if it urged
a total boycott.84 Stressing the fact that Tree Fruits had not held that
only the urging of a total boycott could be banned under the Act,88
the Soft Drink Workers court ruled that a section 8(b)(4) violation could
also be established by the union's failure to limit the appeal to the
confines of the primary dispute.8 6 Further, the court maintained that
the Board need not quantify, by empirical evidence, any actual loss by
the secondary employer, but need only demonstrate "reasonably foreseeable effects" caused by the prohibited conduct.8 7
In conclusion, the court discussed Local 812's claim that prohibiting the union pickets' conduct on these facts infringed their first amendment rights to free speech.88 The Soft Drink Workers court, characterizing the Board's assessment as "painstaking" 80 and the restriction
indicated, or was impossible to ascertain due to the crimping on the edges of
the caps where it was indicated. Id. at 2669-70 & n.30. Thus, the court concluded, this case was distinguishable from an earlier Eighth Circuit "buy
local" case where the union supplied the consumer with a list of the manufacturers favored. Id. at 2667 n.24, citing NLRB v. Upholsterers Frame & Bedding Workers Twin City Local No. 61, 331 F.2d 561, 562, 564 (8th Cir. 1964).
The Soft Drink Workers court found a Second Circuit ease to be supportive of
its position on this issue. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2667 n.14, citing Bedding, Curtain &
Drapery Workers Union, Local 140 v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 495, 502 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968) ("buy local" picketing overbroad when not all unionmade products carried an identifying label).
83. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2669-70. The court stated that consumer frustration
with their inability to identify the favored products, together with vagueness
of the signs, could lead the responsive consumer to totally boycott Monarch. Id.
84. Id. at 2668-69. The court assumed, arguendo, that the union's appeal
"could at most deprive Monarch of the 35% of its retail income stemming
from soda sales." Id. at 2668 n.25.
85. Id. at 2668-69. Tree Fruits, the Soft Drink Workers court noted,
had "referred to the total boycott only as a counter-example of an illegal
consumer boycott." Id. at 2668, citing NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers,
Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. at 63. The Soft Drink Workers court found
support for the conclusion that other consumer boycotts violated § 8(b)(4) in
Safeco Title. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2668-69. That case, the court stated, had
stressed that the harm to a secondary employer was the same as a total boycott
when the struck product accounted for over 90% of the secondary's business.
Id. at 2669. For a discussion of Safeco Title, see notes 48-54 and accompanying
text supra.
86. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2669.
87. Id. at 2669-70. The Soft Drink Workers court reasoned that Safeco
Title did not require proof of a "substantial loss" in all cases of secondary
picketing, but only in the context of that case. Id. at 2669.
88. Id. at 2670.
89. Id. The court remarked that the Board had correctly found the
union's picketing to create "a peculiarly severe burden on commerce by imposing upon a neutral employer economic pressures disproportionate to the
union's legitimate campaign to protect its members' jobs." Id.
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as "narrow," 90 was satisfied that the constitutional concerns voiced by
the Tree Fruits and Safeco Title courts had been met. 91
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Wald expressed two major objections
to the majority's analysis: 1) the lack of a "labor dispute" precluded
a finding of an illegal secondary boycott; 92 and 2) Local 812's picketing was not in violation of section 8(b)(4) since it did not urge a total
boycott of Monarch. 98 After reviewing the narrow construction given
to section 8(b)(4) by the Tree Fruits Court, 94 Judge Wald concluded

that the "isolated evil" prohibited was only union conduct which placed
pressures on a secondary employer to cease trading with the primary
opponent of the union.95
In Judge Wald's view, this "isolated evil" was absent in Soft Drink
Workers because no "labor dispute" existed.96 Although recognizing
that the existence of a traditional labor dispute is not explicitly made
the trigger for the applicability of section 8(b)(4)'s prohibitions, 97 Judge
Wald voiced concern that prohibiting union conduct in the absence
of such a dispute might unduly restrict the union's right "to com90. Id. The court observed that the Board's holding allowed the union
"ample means" to continue its "buy local" campaign. Id.
91. Id.
92. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2672-73 (Wald, J., dissenting). See notes 96-99 and
accompanying text infra.
93. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2673-76 (Wald, J., dissenting). See notes 100-04 and
accompanying text infra.
94. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2671 (Wald, J., dissenting). For a discussion of this
aspect of Tree Fruits, see notes 32-34 and accompanying text supra.
95. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2671 (Wald, J., dissenting). In support of her conclusion, Judge Wald referred to the Tree Fruits statement that
ra]ll
that the legislative history [of § 8(b)(4)] shows in the way of an
"isolated evil" believed to require proscription of peaceful consumer
picketing at secondary sites was its use to persuade the customers of
the secondary employer to cease trading with him in order to force
him to cease dealing with, or to put pressure upon, the primary
employer.
Id., quoting NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377
U.S. at 64. Further, Judge Wald maintained that the Safeco Title holding
had not affected this conclusion and had, in fact, quoted approvingly the above
language from Tree Fruits. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2671 (Wald, J., dissenting),
citing NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Title) 447
U.S. at 608.

96. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2672-73 (Wald, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 2672 (Wald, J., dissenting). Judge Wald, however, argued that,
despite the lack of "explicit" language to this effect, other provisions in the
Act which used the words "labor dispute" indicate congressional intent to
describe the jurisdiction of the Board in those terms. Id. at 2672 & n.5 (Wald,
J., dissenting), citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 151 (1976) (declarations of policy of the
Act); 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1976) (description of totality of cases to which the

Act applies).

For further discussion of the phrase "labor dispute" in the Act,

see notes 55-61 and accompanying text supra.
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municate with the public on a matter of general concern." 8 Courts
should not reach beyond the "guidepost" of a labor dispute, Judge
Wald warned, without proof of the existence of the "isolated evil." 99
Judge Wald's second argument was that the "'isolated evil' did not
exist because the picketing was not aimed at a cessation of all patronage of the neutral employer." 100

Tree Fruits, she stated, held that the

legislative intent to deal with an "isolated evil" only covered the situation where a total boycott of the neutral employer was urged. 01 Noting
that Tree Fruits did not announce the only exception to illegal picketing, 10 2 Judge Wald charged that the majority opinion had totally
98. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2672 (Wald, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 2672-73 (Wald, J., dissenting). Judge Wald argued that in cases
where no labor dispute existed, the courts have emphasized the "functional
similarities" of the facts to such disputes. Id. at 2673 (Wald, J., dissenting).
The majority's reasoning, Judge Wald stated, would bring all "buy local;
American; and good quality" campaigns under the Board's power, which, Judge
Wald opined, was something the legislative history clearly demonstrated was
not intended. Id. at 2673 9- n.3 (Wald, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 2673-76 (Wald, J., dissenting). Judge Wald disagreed with the
majority's assumption that the campaign was aimed at stopping nonlocal
bottlers' sales. Id. at 2672 n.3 (Wald, J., dissenting). In Judge Wald's view,
"[t]he only consumer action which aids the union to achieve its goal of enhancing job opportunities would be an affirmative purchase of local soda." Id.
(emphasis in original). Judge Wald concluded that a buy local campaign, with
signs urging the affirmative purchase of local products, is a "leap of imagination" away from a negative appeal to boycott the secondary employer. Id. at
2675-76 (Wald, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 2674 (Wald, J., dissenting). Judge Wald again quoted Tree
Fruits as supporting her position:
There is thus nothing in the legislative history prior to the convening
of the Conference Committee which shows any congressional concern with consumer picketing beyond that with the "isolated evil" of
its use to cut ofl the business of a secondary employer as a means of
forcing him to stop doing business with the primary employer.
Id., quoting NLRB v. Fruit &cVegetable Packers, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377
U.S. at 68 (emphasis supplied by Judge Wald). Moreover, Judge Wald noted
that Safeco Title supported this conclusion when it analogized a boycott comprising a high percentage of the secondary employer's business, to the situation
hypothesized in Tree Fruits where the boycott was "reasonably calculated to
induce customers not to patronize the neutral at all." 105 L.R.R.M. at 267475 (Wald, J., dissenting), citing NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local
1001 (Safeco Title), 447 U.S. at 608.
102. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2674 (Wald, J., dissenting). Judge Wald stated that
such a reading of Tree Fruits "is standing the case on its head," for the Tree
Fruits Court had merely indicated what conduct could fall within § 8(b)(4)'s
proscription. Id. For further discussion of judge Wald's statements on this
point, see note 101 supra.
According to Judge Wald, the Tree Fruits decision, as modified in Safeco
Title, had enunciated the test of the "threaten, coerce, or restrain" language
in the statute, to be whether the product boycott appeal could "reasonably . . .
threaten the neutral party with ruin or substantial loss." 105 L.R.R.M. at
2676 (Wald, J., dissenting), quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union,
Local 1001 (Safeco Title), 447 U.S. at 615-16 n.ll. Judge Wald asserted that
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ignored the teachings of that case and had created an "unwarranted"
new test for section 8(b)(4) violations by holding "that it is enough that
the customers may be 'confused.'" 103
Judge Wald concluded that the majority had, practically speaking,
banned all consumer picketing unless "stringent standards" can be met
by the union pickets.104
It is submitted that the Soft Drink Workers court, by finding that
the union's conduct amounted to a secondary boycott in violation of
section 8(b)(4),105 has strayed far afield from the repeated Supreme
Court pronouncements that the first amendment constrains the reach of
that section. 'o0 The opinion by Chief Judge Wright fails to consider
whether there is present the "clearest indication" of congressional inthere had been no finding which established a violation of this test, and, in
fact, none could be, since the nonlocal products at most accounted for less than
seven percent of Monarch's total business. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2675 & n.l3 (Wald,
J., dissenting).
103. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2675 (Wald, J., dissenting). The majority's "strict"
interpretation of the "vague sign" test, Judge Wald claimed, was factually unsupportable in that the thrust of that test - the protection of secondary employers from pickets conveying a total boycott message when not intended could under no construction be found to be violated in the affirmative message
"buy local." Id. at 2675-76 (Wald, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the
"vague sign" test, see notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra.
104. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2675 (Wald, J., dissenting). Judge Wald remarked,
"The opinion, dangerously I think, systematically discards each of the limitations which might be relied upon to avoid first amendment difficulties with
[§ 8(b)(4)]." Id. at 2676 (Wald, J., dissenting).
105. For a discussion of the majority's analysis, see notes 62-91 and accompanying text supra.
106. For a discussion of the relevant Supreme Court cases, see notes 27-39
& 48-54 and accompanying text supra.
It is suggested that, as a preliminary matter, the Solt Drink Workers court
correctly rejected the contention that a traditional "labor dispute" is a prerequisite to both Board jurisdiction, and a finding of a § 8(b)(4) violation. For
a discussion of the court's analysis regarding this issue, see notes 63-70 and
accompanying text supra. For Judge Wald's dissenting argument, see notes
96-99 and accompanying text supra.
The only limitation on the Board's jurisdiction is found in § 10(a) which
provides: "The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any
person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce."

29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976) (emphasis added). No unfair labor practice enumerated in § 8 of the Act is defined using the words "labor dispute." See id.
§ 158(a)-(g). In each instance, the conduct regulated does not gain sudden
significance when it occurs in a traditional labor dispute. Rather, it represents
the legislature's view of activities to be stopped in order to effectuate the dedared policy of eliminating "the causes of certain substantial obstructions to
the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions."
Id. § 151. See generally National Maritime Union v. NLRB (Delta Steamship
Lines), 346 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965). For a discussion of a contrary view, see notes 44-51 and accompanying text supra. Further, as noted by several commentators, a preliminary requisite of a labor
dispute in secondary boycott questions would seriously hamper the goal of
protecting secondary employers from illegal activities that fall beyond the
technical interpretation of a traditional labor dispute. See note 60 supra.
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tent to ban an "isolated evil," 107 or whether the union's conduct is
equivalent to a total boycott of the secondary employer.s0 8
The Tree Fruits court chose its narrow mode of statutory analysis
due to concerns that an overbroad proscription of secondary activities
would unconstitutionally infringe upon the union's free speech.109 The
majority opinion in Soft Drink Workers failed, as noted by Judge
Wald,21 0 to consider language in the legislative history which indicates
an intent not to reach buy local campaigns through section 8(b)(4).1
Thus, by ignoring the legislative desire, the court has bypassed the
limitation imposed by Tree Fruits that was formulated to avoid first
amendment conflicts.
More fundamentally, it is submitted, the Soft Drink Workers court
2
misconstrued the relevant cases of Tree Fruits11
and Safeco Title."l3
Although correctly stating that the union conduct must be directed to
an illegal objective and use coercive means,"14 the court ignored the
basic thrust of this two prong test - whether the picketing has the
effect of urging a total boycott of the secondary employer." 65 Instead,
107. See notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra. For a more detailed
criticism of this point, see notes 109-11 and accompanying text infra.
108. See notes 37-39 9c 52-54 and accompanying text supra. For a more
detailed criticism of this point, see notes 112-21 and accompanying text infra.
109. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
110. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2673 &cn.8 (Wald, J., dissenting).
111. Id. As Judge Wald noted, the legislative history of § 8(b)(4) reveals a
contrary indication for "buy local" campaigns:
Mr. Goldwater: I have been asked by people who are vitally concerned whether .

.

. anything in the conference report would limit or

prohibit the buy-America campaigns which are being carried on by
certain unions and business groups, and even by some governmental
bodies. I should like to ask the distinguished chairman of the conference committee whether the report was intended to have this effect.
It is certainly my own conviction that no such effect was intended,
either by the Senate or by the conferees.
Mr. Kennedy: I know that a good deal of effort has been made by
some groups of workers ... to make sure that their working standards

are protected. The answer to the Senator's question is no, it was not
intended that the conference report have such an effect. I am glad
we have had the opportunity to establish legislative history in this
matter.
Id., quoting 105 CONG. REc. 17899 (1959).
112. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
113. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
114. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2664.
115. For a discussion of the relevant portions of Tree Fruits and Safeco
Title, see notes 37-39 Sc52-54 and accompanying text supra.
In Tree Fruits, the Court stated that the illegal secondary picketing intended to be proscribed by Congress was that picketing which will "persuade
the customers of the secondary employer to cease trading with him in order to
force him to cease dealing with, or to put pressure upon, the primary employer."
377 U.S. at 63 (emphasis added). The Safeco Title Court recognized the
validity of this formulation. 447 U.S. at 612. In fact, the Safeco Title Court
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the Soft Drink Workers court stated that the union conduct could be
proscribed if the picketing harms the neutral employer beyond the
legitimate union objective." 6
Both the Board and the court facilely asserted that coercion was
17
found in that the union had violated the "vague sign" standard.
The thrust of this test is also directed at whether the picket signs signal
the consumer to a general boycott."s As Judge Wald correctly noted,
however, a buy local campaign is "a leap of imagination" away from a
negative appeal to boycott the secondary employer totally." 9 In effect,
the union could violate section 8(b)(4) whenever it inferentially urged
the consumer to boycott products not being struck, 20 regardless of the
impact upon the secondary employer. This formulation would ban
conduct that fails to reach the coercive means test of "ruin or sub2
stantial loss" announced in Safeco Title.1 1
It is contended that the holding in Soft Drink Workers represents
the furthest relaxation of the strict standard set in Tree Fruits for finding an unfair labor practice in a union's picketing. By upholding the
Board's ruling, the District of Columbia Circuit has encouraged the
Board to apply the Soft Drink Workers analysis to similar situations in
the other circuits. Not only are unions placed under a cloud of suspicion whenever they picket secondary employers, but their rights of
free speech are likely to be chilled as a result of this decision.
W. James McKay
took great pains to equate its factual situation to that type of conduct, noting
that the 90% reliance of the secondary employers on the primary's product
"leaves responsive consumers no realistic option other than to boycott the title
companies altogether." 447 U.S. at 613 (emphasis added). The Court went
on to specifically hold that the union's conduct is "reasonably calculated to
induce customers not to patronize the neutral parties at all." Id. at 614
(emphasis added).
116. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2887. The court stated that it would be sufficient to
invoke the sanctions of § 8(b)(4) if the picketing "may cause consumers to boycott products to which the union is indifferent or even those which the union
favors, and thus may subject the neutral employer to economic pressure and
harm which exceed the scope of the union's legitimate campaign." Id.
117. Id. at 2675-76.

118. See United Paperworkers Local 382 (Duro Paper Bag), 236 N.L.R.B.
No. 183 (1978).

119. 105 L.R.R.M. at 2667-76 (Wald, J., dissenting).
120. The majority reasoning could be used to ban any union campaign
urging a consumer to buy a certain product, as by implication, the consumer
would forgo any product capable of being substituted with the preferred
product.
121. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
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